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DOUBLE TROUBLE WITH DOUBLE
DESCRIPTION: A CONSIDERATION OF STATE V.
MONTOYA AND ITS APPLICATION OF
THE RULE OF LENITY
Ashley Funkhouser*

I. INTRODUCTION
In State v. Montoya,1 the New Mexico Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether simultaneously punishing a defendant for shooting at a
motor vehicle and voluntary manslaughter for the same action is a violation of double jeopardy. Specifically, the court evaluated the case as a
double description case, where “the same conduct results in multiple convictions under different statutes.”2 Not only did the court hold that Defendant’s two convictions were a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause
of the United States Constitution,3 overruling State v. Gonzales,4 State v.
Dominguez,5 and State v. Riley,6 but it also altered the rule in such a way
that future cases that raise double description will most likely be resolved
in favor of the defendant.
This note first discusses pertinent double description precedent in
New Mexico and the cases that the Montoya court overruled.7 It will then
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* Class of 2015, University of New Mexico School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor George Bach for his guidance and feedback on this article, as well as for his
encouragement and consistently positive attitude in general. I would also like to thank
Justin Muehlmeyer, Chris Dodd, Kevin Holmes, and the staff of the New Mexico Law
Review for helping me wrap my head around the concept of double jeopardy. Finally,
I’d like to thank my family for always being there.
1. 2013-NMSC-020, 306 P.3d 426.
2. Id. ¶ 30 (internal quotation marks omitted).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 2.
4. 1992-NMSC-003, 113 N.M. 221, 824 P.2d 1023.
5. 2005-NMSC-001, 137 N.M. 1, 106 P.3d 563.
6. 2010-NMSC-005, 147 N.M. 557, 226 P.3d 656.
7. The court gives a lengthy description of several double jeopardy cases to illustrate the history of double jeopardy law in New Mexico. However, these cases are
cumulative to my argument, and as such, I have omitted them. These cases include
State v. Contreras, 1995-NMSC-056, 120 N.M. 486, 903 P.2d 228 (holding that the legislature did not intend convictions for felony murder that the underlying predicate
felony), State v. Santillanes, 2001-NMSC-018, 130 N.M. 464, 27 P.3d 456 (convictions
for vehicular homicide and child abuse resulting in death is double description when
the basis for the convictions was killing a child victim in a drunk driving accident),
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recount the court’s discussion of important cases in double jeopardy jurisprudence and the rationale behind overruling Gonzales, Dominguez, and
Riley. Next, this note looks at the importance of State v. Varela,8 where
the court held that convictions for shooting at a dwelling and homicide is
a violation of double jeopardy.9 Finally, this note focuses on the Montoya
court’s emphasis on the rule of lenity in determining whether convictions
under separate statutes violate double description.10 This note argues that
the court could have overruled Gonzales, Dominguez, and Riley by extending the holding from Varela without reaching the rule of lenity at all.
Applying the rule of lenity without explicitly stating what is ambiguous about the statutes in question could have a dramatic effect on the
future of double description jurisprudence by limiting the instances in
which a defendant may be convicted under multiple statutes.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
“This case, like all too many that come before our courts, erupted
from a toxic mixture of testosterone and guns,” stated Justice Daniels as
he began his explanation of State v. Montoya.11 After an altercation involving gunfire between Defendant’s friends and another gang,12 the Defendant and his friends were standing in the driveway of Defendant’s
parents’ home, tending to Defendant’s injured brother.13 A Ford Expedition containing members of the rival gang drove by the Defendant’s
house, shooting at Defendant and his group again.14 Defendant ran inside,
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State v. Frazier, 2007-NMSC-032, 142 N.M. 120, 164 P.3d 1 (the predicate felony for a
felony murder conviction is always subsumed by the felony murder conviction, and
the defendant can never be convicted of both), State v. Cooper, 1997-NMSC-058, 124
N.M. 277, 949 P.2d 660 (convictions for felony murder and second-degree murder of
the same victim violated double jeopardy), and State v. Gallegos, 2011-NMSC-027,
149 N.M. 704, 254 P.3d 655 (multiple conspiracy convictions for conspiracy to commit
the same crime violate double jeopardy).
8. 1999-NMSC-045, 128 N.M. 454, 993 P.2d 1280.
9. Id. ¶ 1.
10. The rule of lenity is defined as “[t]he judicial doctrine holding that a court, in
construing an ambiguous criminal statute that sets out multiple or inconsistent punishments, should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the more lenient punishment.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1449 (9th ed. 2009).
11. State v. Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 1, 306 P.3d 426.
12. Some members of Defendant’s group belonged to a gang known as the Northside Locos, whereas the members of the other group were in a rival gang, Brewtown.
Id. ¶ 4.
13. Id. ¶ 6.
14. Id.
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Id. ¶ 9.
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Id. ¶ 15.
Id. ¶ 10.
Id.
Id. ¶ 11.
Id. ¶¶ 11–12
Id. ¶ 11; see also State v. Frazier, 2007-NMSC-032, ¶¶ 1, 40, 142 N.M. 120, 164
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returned with an AK-47, and began shooting at the Expedition.15 Defendant shot the victim, Diego Delgado, seven times, including one shot to
the head.16 Delgado died as a result of the multiple gunshot wounds.17
Defendant was indicted on nine felony counts, including shooting at
a motor vehicle resulting in great bodily harm and a homicide count of
deliberate first-degree murder or in the alternative, first-degree felony
murder.18 At trial, the district court judge gave the jurors instructions on
deliberate first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and voluntary
manslaughter.19 Separately, the judge instructed the jury to consider felony murder.20 While the judge instructed the jury on the essential provocation element distinguishing second-degree murder from manslaughter,
he did not instruct them that lack of sufficient provocation is an element
of felony murder.21 This was an issue because a defendant must be guilty
of second-degree murder to be found guilty of first-degree felony murder.22 During deliberation, the jury asked the district court judge whether
it must find Defendant guilty of felony murder if it already found him
guilty of manslaughter.23 The district court judge simply replied, “‘[e]ach
crime charged in the indictment should be considered separately.’”24 Defendant was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter and first-degree felony murder for the felonies of shooting at a motor vehicle and shooting at
a motor vehicle resulting in great bodily harm.25 He was sentenced to life
imprisonment for first-degree felony murder.26
The district court judge vacated the shooting at a motor vehicle and
voluntary manslaughter convictions, reasoning that under New Mexico
Supreme Court precedent interpreting the Double Jeopardy Clause, Defendant could not be punished for felony murder and for the lesser-included predicate felony.27 Defendant appealed his voluntary
manslaughter and felony murder convictions directly to the New Mexico
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Supreme Court.28 On appeal, the court determined that the felony murder conviction was fundamental error because the jury instructions for
felony murder did not include an instruction that lack of provocation distinguishes heat-of-passion voluntary manslaughter from second-degree
murder.29
As a result of its holding that the jury instructions were flawed, the
court had to reinstate Montoya’s voluntary manslaughter and shooting at
a motor vehicle charges.30 This raised the issue of whether both convictions could be allowed to stand under the Double Jeopardy Clause.31
B. Legal Background
1. Double Description
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states, “nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”32 The Double Jeopardy clause applies in two situations—in a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal or
conviction, or multiple punishments for the same offense.33 When a defendant is charged with multiple violations of the same offense, the case is
called a “unit-of-prosecution” case.34 When a defendant is charged under
multiple statutes for conduct that was part of the same act, the case is a
“double description” case, the type of case at issue in Montoya.35
Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court often disagree about how the
double jeopardy precedent it has created should be applied.36 Professor
George C. Thomas III37 states that the efforts of the Supreme Court of
the United States to make coherent double jeopardy law in general have
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28. Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 12. See also N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (stating
that district court judgments imposing a death sentence or life imprisonment are appealed directly to the Supreme Court).
29. Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, ¶¶ 13–21
30. Id. ¶ 28.
31. Id.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 2.
33. Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 23.
34. Id. ¶ 30 (citation omitted).
35. Id.
36. See 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 17.4(b), 87 (3rd
ed. 2007).
37. Professor Thomas is a Board of Governors Professor of Law and Judge Alexander P. Waugh, Sr. Distinguished Scholar at Rutgers University School of Law. He
has written extensively on the subject of criminal procedure, and double jeopardy in
particular. The New Mexico Supreme Court has referenced his works in their own
opinions. See State v. Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 31, 306 P.3d. 426; Swafford v.
State, 1991-NMSC-043, ¶ 26, 112 N.M. 3, 810 P.2d 1223.
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“largely failed,”38 and that double description is particularly difficult for
the United States Supreme Court to work with because there are far
more criminal statutes in effect today than there were at the time the
constitution was written.39
2. Legislative Intent
“[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature
intended.”40 In Brown v. Ohio,41 the U.S. Supreme Court gave a rationale
for deferring to legislative intent, stating that “the Fifth Amendment
double jeopardy guarantee serves principally as a restraint on courts and
prosecutors. The legislature remains free under the Double Jeopardy
Clause to define crimes and fix punishments.”42 In other words, the
Double Jeopardy Clause only prevents courts and prosecutors from imposing greater sentences than the legislature intended; the legislature remains free to punish unitary conduct with multiple statutes if it so
desires.43
The U.S. Supreme Court created the Blockburger test in Blockburger v. United States44 as a way to determine whether a sentence violated double jeopardy, even if Congress intended to impose cumulative
sentences with multiple statutes.45 The Blockburger test is as follows:
[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two
distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine
whether there are two punishable offenses or only one [for double
jeopardy purposes] is whether each provision requires proof of a
fact which the other does not.46
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GEORGE C. THOMAS III, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE HISTORY,
Id. at 95.
Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983).
432 U.S. 161 (1977).
Id. at 165.
Id.
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, supra note 36, at 79.
Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
See State v. Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 31, 306 P.3d. 426.
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The Blockburger test is a strict elements test, meaning that the court
looks only to the language of the statutes to determine if the statutes are
the same for the purposes of double jeopardy.47 However, the U.S. Supreme Court later decided that Blockburger should only be applied to
statutory formulation, and therefore only provides half of the answer to
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the double description issue.48 The New Mexico Supreme Court takes
double description analysis further.49 First, the statutes must survive the
Blockburger test, then the court looks for evidence that the legislature
intended cumulative punishment.50 It is this second part, looking at the
legislative intent, which changed significantly with Montoya.
3. The Rule of Lenity
The rule of lenity is “[t]he judicial doctrine holding that a court, in
construing an ambiguous criminal statute that sets out multiple or inconsistent punishments, should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the more
lenient punishment.”51 The rationale guiding this rule is that, “if doubt
exists about whether the legislature meant to create distinct blameworthiness, courts should presume singular blameworthiness.”52 Unit of prosecution cases apply the rule of lenity with some regularity, but its
application to double description cases is less consistent.53
Although the rule of lenity applies to double description cases involving lesser-included offenses, its application to other types of double
description cases is less clear.54 An offense is generally considered a
lesser-included offense when “the proof necessary to establish the greater
offense will of necessity establish every element of the lesser offense,
without regard to the nature of the offenses.”55 Even though the lesserincluded offense doctrine is strikingly similar to the Blockburger test, not
every double description case in New Mexico involves lesser-included offenses, because New Mexico courts apply both Blockburger and a legislative intent analysis to determine whether separate convictions for unitary
conduct violate double description.56

R
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48. THOMAS, supra note 38, at 101 (meaning that the Blockburger test should only
consider the actual statutes as opposed to the criminal indictments in individual cases
when doing a same offense evaluation).
49. Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 29 (“In addition to requiring a narrow and
mechanical analysis of generic statutory element, the inquiry calls for a broader and
substantially more complex search for indicia of legislative intent in the context of
particular cases.” (citation omitted)).
50. Id.
51. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1449 (9th ed. 2009).
52. THOMAS, supra note 38, at 149.
53. Swafford v. State, 1991-NMSC-043, ¶ 15, 112 N.M. 3, 810 P.2d 1223.
54. See Id. ¶ 15 (stating that the application of the rule of lenity to double description cases has been “spotty”).
55. JAY A. SIEGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND
SOCIAL POLICY 107 (1969).
56. State v. Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 29, 306 P.3d. 426.
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In Whalen v. United States,57 the Supreme Court of the United States
stated that the rule of lenity should be applied in double jeopardy cases
when the matter of legislative intent is “not entirely free from doubt.”58 In
Whalen, the court analyzed the statutes of rape and felony murder, determining that the defendant could not be convicted of rape if he is convicted of felony murder.59 The rape is the predicate felony for the felony
murder charge, and is therefore a lesser-included offense.60 The Court
also applied the rule of lenity in Bell v. United States,61 stating that “[i]t
may be fairly said to be a presupposition of our law to resolve doubts in
the enforcement of a penal code against the imposition of a harsher
punishment.”62
III. RATIONALE
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445 U.S. 684 (1980).
Id. at 694.
Id. at 694–96.
Id. at 710.
349 U.S. 81 (1955).
Id. at 83.
Id. ¶¶ 13–27.
Id. ¶ 54.
Id. ¶ 30.
Id.
Id. ¶ 31 (citation omitted).
Swafford v. State, 1991-NMSC-043, ¶ 30, 112 N.M. 3, 810 P.2d 1223.
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In Montoya, the New Mexico Supreme Court first held that the jury
was incorrectly instructed on an essential element of Defendant’s felony
murder charge, and that Defendant’s conviction for voluntary manslaughter precluded him from being retried using appropriate jury instructions.63
The court then determined that Defendant could not be punished
for voluntary manslaughter and shooting at a motor vehicle resulting in
great bodily harm when both convictions were based on the same action.64 The State conceded that Defendant’s culpable conduct was unitary,
meaning that Defendant’s single act of shooting was the common factual
basis for both the shooting at a motor vehicle and the voluntary manslaughter charge.65 Because Defendant challenged his conviction under
different statutes for unitary conduct, his appeal was treated as a double
description case.66 The court first applied the Blockburger test, which determined “in the abstract whether each statutory offense ‘requires proof
of a fact which the other does not.’”67 If the court’s application of the test
determines that one statute subsumes another, the statutes are the same
for double jeopardy purposes.68 However, because shooting at a motor
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The first part of our inquiry asks the question that [U.S.] Supreme
Court precedents assume to be true: whether the conduct underly-
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69. Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 32.
70. Id. (citing Swafford, 1991-NMSC-043, ¶ 31).
71. Swafford, 1991-NMSC-043, ¶ 32.
72. See Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 32.
73. Id. ¶ 4.
74. Id. ¶ 5.
75. Id. ¶¶ 14–15.
76. Id. ¶ 8 (citation omitted).
77. Id. ¶ 15.
78. Id.
79. See id. ¶ 25 (stating the test to be used in double description cases, but failing
to mention the rule of lenity as part of the test).
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vehicle does not require a death and voluntary manslaughter does not
require that one shoot at a motor vehicle, the statutes survived the Blockburger test.69
The court then had to determine whether the legislature intended
separate punishment for unitary conduct under Swafford v. State.70 The
court examined “the particular evil sought to be addressed by each offense” and stated that “[i]f several statutes are not only usually violated
together, but also seem designed to protect the same social interest, the
inference becomes strong that the function of the multiple statutes is only
to allow alternative means of prosecution.”71
In New Mexico, the test relevant to double description cases comes
from Swafford.72 In Swafford, the defendant was convicted of third-degree criminal sexual penetration, incest, aggravated assault with intent to
commit a felony and false imprisonment.73 The defendant appealed his
convictions on the grounds that the convictions under separate statutes
arose from unitary conduct, and was therefore a double description violation of double jeopardy.74
Swafford discussed the rule of lenity as the court outlined the tests
and considerations that go into a double jeopardy analysis.75 It stated that
the Supreme Court of the United States applies the rule of lenity to ambiguous statutes, with the presumption that “the legislature did not intend
to fragment a course of conduct into separate offenses.”76 However, the
court in Swafford explained that the rule of lenity always applies in “unit
of prosecution” cases, but that its application to double description cases
is unclear.77 The court stated that lenity applies “only after the language,
structure and legislative history of the statutes at issue raise an indication
of leniency.”78 Ultimately the court rejected including the rule of lenity as
an element of the test.79 Swafford went on to state:
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ing the offenses is unitary, i.e., whether the same conduct violates
both statutes. The second part focuses on the statutes at issue to
determine whether the legislature intended to create separately
punishable offenses.80
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80. Id.
81. Id. ¶ 30.
82. Id. ¶ 31.
83. Id. ¶ 32.
84. Id. ¶ 31.
85. See Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 32 (citing Swafford v. State, 1991-NMSC043, ¶ 32).
86. Id. ¶ 2.
87. Id. ¶¶ 35, 37, 38.
88. State v. Gonzales, 1992-NMSC-003, ¶ 6, 113 N.M. 221, 824 P.2d 1023; State v.
Dominguez, 2005-NMSC-001, ¶ 5, 137 N.M. 1, 106 P.3d 563; State v. Riley, 2010NMSC-005, ¶ 35, 147 N.M. 557, 226 P.3d 656 (relying on Gonzales and Dominguez).
89. Gonzales, 1992-NMSC-003, ¶ 12.
90. Id. ¶ 4.
91. Id. ¶ 8.
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In the second part of the test, Swafford pointed to the Blockburger test,
and explained that the court must first determine if the statutes survive
the Blockburger test as distinct offenses.81 However, surviving the Blockburger test only raises a presumption that the statutes are distinct for the
purposes of sentencing; the court must still look at “other indicia of legislative intent”82 to determine the “particular evil sought to be addressed by
each offense.”83 Such indicia include the language, history, and subject of
the statutes.84 Double description cases have applied this test from Swafford and it continues to be the relevant inquiry.85
In State v. Montoya, the New Mexico Supreme Court overruled
State v. Gonzales and the two cases that relied on it, State v. Dominguez
and State v. Riley.86 These three cases all involved shooting at or from a
motor vehicle, and some form of homicide.87 In each opinion, the court
applied the test set forth in Swafford, where statutes that survive the
Blockburger strict elements test should be analyzed for the social harm
that the legislature intended to address with each statute.88 Before Montoya, the court determined that the legislature intended these statutes to
address different social harms, and therefore it was not a violation of
double jeopardy for the defendant to be convicted under both statutes.89
In Gonzales, the defendant appealed on double description grounds
because he was convicted of first-degree murder and shooting at a motor
vehicle.90 The court reached its holding in Gonzales by using the language
from Swafford, first determining that the conduct was unitary.91 It then
applied the Blockburger test, determining that the statutes survived
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92. Id. ¶ 10.
93. Id.
94. Id. ¶ 12.
95. Id.
96. State v. Riley, 2010-NMSC-005, ¶ 35; State v. Dominguez, 2005-NMSC-001,
¶¶ 8, 16.
97. Dominguez, 2005-NMSC-001, ¶ 1.
98. Id. ¶ 26.
99. Riley, 2010-NMSC-005, ¶ 35.
100. Id. ¶ 35.
101. Id. ¶¶ 34–35.
102. State v. Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 37, 306 P.3d. 426.
103. Id. ¶¶ 37–38.
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Blockburger because shooting at a motor vehicle does not require that a
person die, and first-degree murder does not require that the victim die
because he was shot in a vehicle.92 Therefore, each statute required proof
of a fact that the other did not.93 Finally, it determined that the social
harm that the legislature intended to prevent with the shooting at a motor
vehicle statute was property damage and bodily injury, whereas first-degree murder was intended to prevent unlawful killings.94 Thus, because
the statutes addressed different social harms and neither statute subsumed the other, convictions under both shooting at a motor vehicle and
first-degree murder were permitted.95 Gonzales remained the applicable
legal rule for similar statutes, controlling the decisions in Dominguez and
Riley.96
In Dominguez, the defendant was convicted of “shooting at or from
a motor vehicle” and voluntary manslaughter.97 The Dominguez court extended the reasoning from Gonzales, holding that convictions for both
shooting at a motor vehicle and voluntary manslaughter did not violate
double jeopardy.98
Finally, in Riley, the court reaffirmed its holding in Gonzales that
shooting at a motor vehicle and first-degree murder convictions for unitary conduct did not violate double jeopardy.99 The court elected to follow stare decisis and held that the convictions were permissible because
the defendant did not offer any reasons to depart from the precedent.100
However, the court did not do much to defend its holdings in Gonzales
and Dominguez, it merely stated that the cases were still valid, and it did
not have a good reason to overturn them.101
The decisions in Dominguez and Riley were sharply divided, and the
dissents in those opinions indicated a shift in the court’s position on the
validity of the holding of Gonzales.102 The dissents also suggested a growing consensus among the justices that Gonzales, Dominguez, and Riley
should be overruled.103 Justice Bosson’s dissent in Riley was practically an
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104. Riley, 2010-NMSC-005, ¶ 45 (Bosson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
105. Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 39.
106. Id. ¶ 41.
107. Id. ¶ 52.
108. State v. Contreras, 1995-NMSC-056, ¶ 19, 120 N.M. 486, 903 P.2d 228.
109. Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 42.
110. Id. ¶ 43 (citing State v. Cooper, 1997-NMSC-058, ¶¶ 53, 63, 124 N.M. 277, 949
P.2d 660).
111. 2001-NMSC-018, 130 N.M. 464, 27 P.3d 456.
112. Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 43.
113. State v. Varela, 1999-NMSC-045, ¶ 40, 993 P.2d 1280, 128 N.M. 454.
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invitation to defense attorneys to specifically challenge the holdings in
Gonzales, Dominguez, and Riley, indicating that the court would welcome the opportunity to reconsider them.104 Justice Bosson got his wish in
Montoya, where the Defendant finally argued specific reasons for overruling Gonzales.105
In the years since Gonzales, the court addressed the double description issue using the Swafford analysis in cases that involved statutes other
than the statutes considered in Gonzales, Dominguez, Riley, and Montoya.106 The Gonzales line was one of the few where the court found no
double description issue, making it difficult to reconcile with the double
jeopardy jurisprudence as a whole.107
One case of particular importance to the Montoya court was State v.
Contreras, in which the court decided for the first time that convictions
for felony murder and the underlying predicate felony violated double
description.108 Montoya also noted that State v. Frazier greatly expanded
the holding of Contreras, because it held that the legislature did not intend convictions for both felony murder and the predicate felony under
any circumstances, so there was no need to evaluate this issue on a caseby-case basis.109 Further, Montoya recognized that in State v. Cooper, the
court held that a defendant could not be punished for felony murder and
the second-degree murder that the felony murder is predicated on.110
Finally, Montoya stated that the decisions in Cooper and State v. Santillanes111 “substantially eroded” the reasoning underlying Gonzales, because in each case the statutes passed the Blockburger test and were still
found to be a violation of double jeopardy if a defendant was convicted
for unitary conduct under both.112
In Varela, the court determined that convictions for shooting at a
dwelling and felony murder violated double jeopardy.113 In Varela, the
court determined that shooting at a trailer and killing the person inside
was unitary, thus requiring an analysis of the legislative intent behind the
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shooting at a dwelling statute.114 If the legislature did not intend for death
to be used as a substitute for “great bodily harm,” then it would have
been error for the court to use shooting at a dwelling as a basis for a
felony murder conviction.115 The court looked to the social harm that the
legislature sought to prevent by outlawing shooting at a dwelling.116 The
court then concluded that felony murder subsumed the elements of
shooting at a dwelling; therefore, Varela’s convictions for both offenses
violated double jeopardy.117
In Varela, the court examined NMSA 1978, Section 30-3-8(A)
(1993), which defines the offenses of shooting at a dwelling or occupied
building.118 The first provision of the statute prohibits shooting at a dwelling or occupied building, and the court interpreted that as the legislature
seeking to prevent that very action.119 The next three scenarios the statute
addresses are: (1) shooting at a dwelling that does not cause any great
bodily harm, (2) shooting at a dwelling that causes injury, and (3) shooting at a dwelling that causes great bodily injury.120 The court stated that it
would be absurd to construe the statute to not include situations in which
the victim dies, and held that a shooting at a dwelling in which the victim
dies is covered by one of the three levels of punishment laid out in the
statute.121
The Montoya court stated that Varela is important to its analysis
because Varela recognized that death is part of the harm that the legislature intended to prevent in outlawing drive-by shootings.122 It reached
that conclusion by recognizing that the analysis in Varela is applicable to
Montoya because it interpreted different provisions of the same statute.123
The Montoya court explained that this analysis of the legislature’s intent
is supported by the way that the shooting at or from a motor vehicle
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114. Id. ¶ 40.
115. Id. ¶ 38.
116. Id. ¶¶ 11–13.
117. Id. ¶ 40.
118. Id. ¶ 13.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 45.
123. Id. ¶ 44. The Dominguez court rejected the argument that Varela had implicitly overturned Gonzales. State v. Dominguez, 2005-NMSC-001, ¶ 9, 137 N.M. 1, 106
P.3d 563 (reasoning that because the definition of great bodily harm used by the
Varela court was available at the time that Gonzales was decided as well, and the
court still determined that the elements of first-degree murder and shooting at a motor vehicle resulting in great bodily harm were different, Gonzales was still controlling; the Montoya court does not explain how it refutes this logic.)
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124. Id. ¶ 45 (stating that assaultive crimes have gradations based on the degree of
harm inflicted on the person and property damage crimes have gradations based on
the value of the property damaged).
125. 2011-NMSC-024, ¶ 60, 150 N.M. 232, 258 P.3d 1024.
126. Gutierrez, 2011-NMSC-024, ¶ 48 (quotation omitted).
127. See id. ¶ 58.
128. State v. Swick, 2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 21, 279 P.3d 747.
129. Gutierrez, 2011-NMSC-024, ¶ 52, 60.
130. Id. ¶ 59.
131. 2012-NMSC-018, 279 P.3d 747.
132. 2006-NMSC-036, 140 N.M. 182, 141 P.3d 526.
133. Id. ¶ 25.
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statute is structured, paralleling assaultive crimes (which modify the sentence imposed based on the harm done) as opposed to property damage
crimes (which modify the sentence imposed based on the value of the
property taken).124
Next, the Montoya court discussed several cases where the court
overruled double description jurisprudence where it previously found
that convicting the defendant under two statutes for unitary conduct was
constitutional. In State v. Gutierrez, the court held that robbery of a car
and the armed robbery of its keys violated double jeopardy.125
Gutierrez introduced the concept of the modified Blockburger approach for statutes that are “vague and unspecific” or “written with many
alternatives.”126 Under this approach, the court looks at the state’s legal
theory, without looking at the particular facts of the case, to determine
whether convictions under separate statutes violate double jeopardy.127
The reviewing court looks to the charging documents and jury instructions, not just the statute’s text.128 In Gutierrez, the state charged the defendant under the auto burglary statute as well as the general robbery
statute, arguing that the “anything of value” element of the statute was
satisfied when the defendant took the car owner’s car keys.129 The court
found that the “anything of value” language was sufficiently vague to trigger the rule of lenity and prevent convictions under both the auto theft
and general robbery statute.130
The court also applied this theory in another important double
description case, State v. Swick.131 In Swick, the court overruled its decision in State v. Armendariz.132 Armendariz held that convictions for aggravated battery and attempted murder based on unitary conduct were not a
violation of double jeopardy for three reasons: the aggravated battery
and attempted murder statutes addressed different social harms, neither
state indicated that they were different ways of committing the same
crime, and the two crimes are not necessarily violated at the same moment in time.133 In Swick, the court pointed to Armendariz’s reliance on
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134. State v. Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 49, 306 P.3d. 426.
135. State v. Armendariz, 2006-NMSC-036, ¶ 25, 140 N.M. 182, 141 P.3d 526.
136. Swick, 2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 29. The modified Blockburger test announced in
Gutierrez effectively overruled Armendariz. See id. ¶ 19.
137. Id. ¶ 12 (quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)).
138. Id. ¶ 25.
139. Id. ¶ 30.
140. Id. (citation omitted).
141. Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 47 (citing State v. Gutierrez, 2011-NMSC-024, ¶¶
73–74, 76, 78, 150 N.M. 232, 258 P.3d 1024 (Bosson, J., specially concurring)).
142. Id. ¶ 49. This is, perhaps, one of the strangest aspects of the Montoya opinion.
The court discusses the very recently applied modified-Blockburger approach it used
in Swick, and then does nothing to apply it to the facts of Montoya.
143. Id. ¶ 46.
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Gonzales, asserting that both cases applied Blockburger’s strict elements
test without due consideration of the substantive sameness analysis set
forth in Swafford.134 However, the Armendariz court recognized that the
legislature may not have intended cumulative punishment because attempted murder is punished by a much greater sentence than aggravated
battery.135 The court in Swick concluded that this observation about the
severity of the sentences leaves the legislative intent unclear, and as a
result modified Blockburger applied.136
Another important aspect of Swick is that it stated when a statute is
“vague and unspecific,” the court must analyze the State’s legal theory to
determine if each charge requires proof of a fact which the other does
not.137 Swick explains that the statute for attempted murder is a “vague
and unspecific” statute because many forms of conduct can support the
“began to do an act which constituted a substantial part of the murder”
element.138
Swick held that when the legislative intent is still unclear after a
thorough examination, the rule of lenity should apply, and any ambiguity
should be resolved in favor of the defendant.139 The Swick court applied
the rule of lenity because “reasonable minds can differ as to the Legislature’s intent in punishing these two crimes.”140
The Montoya court noted State v. Gutierrez’s adoption of the modified Blockburger approach, and stated that it was critical because it “exemplified how the Court has been ‘rethinking some of the underpinnings
of [its] double jeopardy jurisprudence.’”141 It also recognized that the
modified Blockburger approach was followed in Swick.142
Finally, though it was a unit of prosecution case as opposed to a
double description case, Montoya discusses State v. Gallegos.143 Montoya
stated that the underlying rationale behind trying to punish an act as op-
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posed to violations of multiple statutes, as the court did in Gallegos, “set
a new course for the future application of double jeopardy principles.”144
The court in Montoya noted that the strict mechanical elements test
has faded away over the course of New Mexico double jeopardy jurisprudence and a substantive sameness analysis replaced it.145 In keeping with
this transition, the court in Montoya overruled Gonzales and the cases
that follow it.146
The court concluded that the changes in double jeopardy jurisprudence made the decision in Gonzales “so unworkable as to be intolerable.”147 It stated that:
Applying [the precedents considered] and the rule of lenity, we
can no longer conclude that the Legislature intended that this defendant should receive more than the maximum punishment it determined appropriate for either a drive-by shooting or a
completed homicide, taking into consideration the relationship
between the statutory offenses and their common commission by
unitary conduct, the identical social harms to which they are directed, and their use by the State in this case to impose double
punishment for the killing of the victim.148
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144. Id. (quoting State v. Gallegos, 2011-NMSC-027, ¶ 1, 149 N.M. 704, 254 P.3d
655).
145. Id.
146. Id. ¶ 54.
147. Id. ¶ 52.
148. Id.
149. It is somewhat surprising that, given the recent express adoption of the “modified Blockburger” approach by Swick, that the Court does not do a more thorough
analysis of the charging documents to determine legislative intent in Montoya.
150. Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 52.
151. Id. ¶ 53.
152. Id.
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Although the court stated the factors considered, it did not clearly detail
the analysis it went through to reach a conclusion on many of those
points: the relationship between the offenses, their use by the State,149 or
why the rule of lenity applies.150
The court also held that circumstances justified overruling Gonzales,
Dominguez, and Riley.151 The court addressed the notion that either party
may have justifiably relied on Gonzales and would be unfairly prejudiced
should the opinion be overruled.152 Because the double description issue
is one that is only raised in post-conviction situations, the State, which
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would be the party relying on Gonzales to its detriment, cannot be said to
actually be relying on the decision.153
As a result of the court’s decision to overrule precedent and disallow multiple convictions for the same action, the court determined that
the more severe punishment, shooting at a motor vehicle, should be reinstated.154 The court determined, in keeping with other jurisdictions and its
holding in State v. Swick that the conviction with the shorter sentence
should be vacated to avoid a double jeopardy violation.155 Voluntary manslaughter is a third-degree felony requiring six years imprisonment,156
whereas shooting at a motor vehicle resulting in great bodily harm is a
second-degree felony calling for fifteen years imprisonment when it results in the death of a human being.157 The court imposed the greater
sentence because the court determined it is unacceptable for one to escape punishment for a crime simply because he also violated a statute
with a lesser punishment.158 Regardless of which is considered the more
serious crime, the court must choose to reinstate the one the legislature
designated a more severe punishment.159
Finally, the court discussed Defendant’s claim that he was denied
the right to an impartial jury, determining that he received a fair trial,160
and Defendant’s claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
holding that there was an insufficient record for the court to determine
the claim.161
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C M
Y K

35097-nmx_44-2 Sheet No. 115 Side B

153. Id.
154. Id. ¶ 55.
155. Id.
156. NMSA 1978, § 30-2-3(A) (1994); NMSA 1978, § 31-18-15(A)(7) (2007).
157. NMSA 1978, § 30-3-8(B) (1993); NMSA 1978, § 31-18-15(A)(4).
158. Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 56.
159. Id.
160. Id. ¶¶ 57–63. Defendant’s ex-girlfriend, Elizabeth, testified at the trial that she
knew a person on the jury, Ms. Romero, who was friends the mother of her current
boyfriend. Elizabeth stated that Ms. Romero was biased against the Defendant for his
appearance, telling Elizabeth’s boyfriend’s mother that the Defendant looked
“scary.” Ms. Romero was removed from the jury, but Defendant raised concerns that
she influenced other jurors. The court held that there was no “preliminary showing
that [he or she] has competent evidence that material extraneous to the trial actually
reached the jury,” so Defendant’s right to a fair trial was not violated. Id.
161. Id. ¶ 64. Defendant claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
because his attorney was using suspected of using cocaine during the trial, that the
attorney failed to object to the flawed jury instructions and the allegedly biased juror,
and that as a result he did not receive a fair trial. Id.
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162. Id. ¶ 51 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
163. Id. ¶ 52.
164. Id. ¶ 51 (citing State v. Swick, 2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 30).
165. State v. Frazier, 2007-NMSC-032, ¶ 52, 142 N.M. 120, 164 P.3d 1 (Chavez, C.J.,
specially concurring).
166. Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 54.
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After the extensive evaluation of double description jurisprudence,
the Montoya court did very little to actually apply the rules it laid out. In
fact, discussion of many of the cases seemed almost random, particularly
because the court did not then apply the legal analysis gleaned from those
cases to the issues in Montoya: The court did not apply the modified
Blockburger approach it adopted in Gutierrez and Swick. It also did not
explain what is vague about the statutes at issue in Montoya (a necessary
finding in order for the rule of lenity to apply).
In Montoya, the court emphasized that the rule of lenity applies “in
cases of ambiguity because reasonable minds can differ as to the Legislature’s intent in punishing the [ ] two crimes.”162 In Montoya, the court
must have concluded that the two such statutes Defendant was charged
under were ambiguous because it stated that the rule of lenity applied.163
However, the court did not explain how the statutes are ambiguous.
Without this determination, the court does not have a justification for
applying the rule of lenity.
The court anchored its use of the rule of lenity by relying on
Swick.164 However, the statutes in Swick were much more vague than the
statutes in Montoya, and the court failed to specifically explain what is
vague about shooting at a motor vehicle or voluntary manslaughter. Further, the court did not need to use the rule of lenity to overturn Gonzales,
Dominguez, and Riley. By doing so, the court created a scenario in which
it will be extremely difficult for the State to overcome a double description challenge to convictions based on unitary conduct.
Justice Chavez explained in his special concurrence in Frazier that if
the offenses are the same and the language is ambiguous, then the rule of
lenity applies.165 However, Frazier is distinguishable from Montoya because Montoya did not involve lesser-included offenses. In Montoya, the
offenses do not merge in the traditional way that lesser-included offenses
merge with a greater offense. Rather, the court explains one conviction
given by the jury should have been vacated by the judge for the purposes
of sentencing.166 The problem with thinking about Montoya as a lesserincluded offense case once the felony murder charges are dismissed is
easy to illustrate by analyzing the statutes in question. If the court finds

35097-nmx_44-2 Sheet No. 116 Side B

06/25/2014 11:26:56

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\44-2\NMX204.txt

524

unknown

Seq: 18

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

25-JUN-14

10:45

[Vol. 44

that voluntary manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of shooting at a
motor-vehicle, then it essentially places more importance on a crime that
society may view as less serious.167 On the other hand, if the court finds
that shooting at a motor vehicle is a lesser-included offense of voluntary
manslaughter, it places more importance on a crime that carries a much
shorter jail sentence.168 Either approach leads to an odd result, indicating
that Montoya did not concern the theory of lesser-included offenses, and
the court needed an alternative justification for applying the rule of
lenity.
Although the court clearly explained why the rule of lenity should
apply in Swick, its application to Montoya is less clear. In fact, the court
does not explicitly state in Montoya that the statutes are ambiguous; it
merely states that an application of other double description precedents
and the rule of lenity requires that Gonzales and the cases that follow
from it must be overruled.169 Thus, the major change in Montoya is not so
much the application of the rule of lenity as it is the court’s treatment of
legislative intent. Recognizing that their decision on what the legislature
intended in Gonzales was wrong would have been sufficient to overrule
it. Applying the holding from Varela to Montoya and carefully addressing
the reasons for overruling precedent would have been enough for the
court to reach the same holding as it did.170
By noting the absurdity of interpreting the shooting at or from a
motor vehicle and shooting at a dwelling statute as not including death as
a social harm that the legislature intended to prevent, the Varela court
swiftly dealt with the ambiguity issue that Montoya asserted makes the
rule of lenity so necessary.171 In fact, the court in Varela analyzed a statute
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167. See id. ¶ 56.
168. Id. (stating that third-degree voluntary manslaughter carries a sentence of six
years’ imprisonment, and second-degree shooting at a motor vehicle carries a sentence of fifteen years’ imprisonment).
169. Id. ¶ 52.
170. The Dominguez court addressed the idea of applying Varela instead of Gonzales, and dismissed it vigorously by explaining that the same statutory definition of
great bodily harm used in Varela was available at the time that Gonzales was decided,
and yet the court still held that first-degree murder was distinct from shooting at a
motor vehicle resulting in great bodily harm. State v. Dominguez, 2005-NMSC-001, ¶
9, 106 P.3d 563. The court’s position on the importance of Varela is vastly different in
Montoya than it was in Dominguez, but the Montoya court did not address why it now
places more importance on the analysis of the statutes in Varela than it does on the
analysis in Gonzales. This may be one reason why it could not simply rely on Varela,
and relied on the rule of lenity to bolster its decision to overrule Gonzales, Dominguez, and Riley.
171. See Varela, 1999-NMSC-045, ¶ 13.
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State v. Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 44, 306 P.3d. 426.
Swafford v. State, 1991-NMSC-043, ¶ 25, 112 N.M. 3, 810 P.2d 1223
Id.
Id.
See Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 52.
Id. ¶ 34.
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that is vaguer than the statutes in Montoya (felony murder), making the
Montoya court’s application of the rule of lenity is even more suspicious.
The similarity of the statute in Varela to the one in Montoya makes
it logical to apply the same rationale when reconsidering the shooting at a
motor vehicle statute in Montoya.172 Finding that convictions for shooting
at a motor vehicle and homicide is a violation of double jeopardy is a
simple task once the court finds that death is a social harm that the legislature intended to prevent in passing the shooting at a dwelling statute.
Because the statutes in Varela and Montoya are essentially the same statute, just different subsections of that statute, one can conclude that they
address the same social harm. Furthermore, in applying this analysis the
court eliminates the ambiguity that the rule of lenity is intended to
resolve.
Montoya gives defendants an additional opportunity to prove that
conviction under two statutes for a unitary act is a violation of double
jeopardy. As early as Swafford, the defendant had two opportunities to
do so.173 First, the court uses the Blockburger test to see if one statute
subsumes another.174 Next, if the statutes survive Blockburger, the court
may still invalidate a conviction on double description grounds based on
its interpretation of legislative intent.175 After Montoya, if there is even
the slightest question as to what the legislature intended, the rule of lenity
will apply, thereby resolving the issue in favor of the defendant.176 The
court could have resolved the issue on the second step by applying Varela
and ending the inquiry. Instead, it applied the rule of lenity, for reasons
that are not entirely clear.
It is possible that Montoya is intentionally vague in its application of
the rule of lenity in order to create a consistent rule for all double
description cases, not just cases involving shooting at a motor vehicle and
homicide. The court stated that it has struggled to reconcile those specific
statutes with the rest of double description jurisprudence,177 and the trend
is clearly toward finding multiple punishments for unitary conduct under
two statutes unconstitutional. However, the court did not explain why it
matters that its jurisprudence regarding these particular statutes be in line
with the trend. If double description inquiries are going to be conducted
on a case-by-case analysis involving the facts of the case and legislative

35097-nmx_44-2 Sheet No. 117 Side B

06/25/2014 11:26:56

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\44-2\NMX204.txt

526

unknown

Seq: 20

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

25-JUN-14

10:45

[Vol. 44

V. IMPLICATIONS
The “shooting at a motor vehicle” and “homicide” statutes are commonly violated together, particularly in the context of gang-related vioNMSA 1978, § 12-2A-1 (1997).
NMSA 1978, § 12-2A-20(B)(2) (1997).
See NMSA 1978, § 12-2A-20 (1997).
NMSA 1978, § 30-16-8 (2007).
NMSA 1978, § 30-4-1 (2003).
Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 52.
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intent, it does not follow that the court should be influenced by its decisions involving other statutes and very different fact patterns.
If there is a way to violate two statutes with just one action, double
description comes into play. The court should not allow the fact that it
has disallowed multiple punishments for many double description scenarios to influence how it will rule on a specific double description issue,
because the inquiry is a fact-specific analysis that turns on how the conduct in each case violates the statutes. The Uniform Statute and Rule
Construction Act provides guidance for courts in interpreting statutes.178
In addition to considering the text of the statute, courts may look to the
judicial construction of the same or a similar statute.179 However, the rule
requires courts to look to the language and construction of “similar” statutes.180 In other words, courts should not use interpretations of the embezzlement statute181 to justify a novel reading of the kidnapping
statute,182 because the two statutes are completely different. The same
should hold for double description—the court should not allow its conclusions about whether charges under one set of statutes violate double
description to influence its conclusion about a different set of statutes.
Each combination of statutes should be considered individually, influenced only by cases where the same statutes were at issue. Although this
might lead to different methods of determination depending on the crime
charged, each combination of statutes is unique enough that such individualization might be desirable.
Montoya overturned Gonzales, Dominguez, and Riley, three opinions that grew increasingly unpopular as the court developed its double
description jurisprudence.183 However, it also set the stage for future
double description cases, sending the message that multiple punishments
for unitary conduct will be looked upon with disfavor by the court, to the
extent that it will be nearly impossible to prove that the legislature intended for a defendant to be convicted under two statutes for a single
action.
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lence as seen in Montoya.184 Therefore, the holding in Montoya changes
the potential outcome for many criminal prosecutions in the future. Although the defendant likely will still be charged with both homicide and
shooting at or from a motor vehicle (as double description is an issue that
is considered post-conviction), the defendant will not be required to serve
sentences for both convictions that a jury may impose. Overall, defendants will be looking at less serious consequences than they were before
Montoya was decided.
The most important takeaway from Montoya, however, is that it indicates the future of double description jurisprudence in New Mexico.185
The dissents in the cases leading up to Montoya186 as well as the holdings
in double description cases with statutes unrelated to Montoya indicate a
trend towards a more liberal application of the double description rule.
The majority of the double description cases discussed in Montoya have
held that it is a violation of double jeopardy to convict the defendant of
both offenses he was charged with. In the future, the court may interpret
legislative intent in such a way that precludes punishment for both offenses charged whenever possible. When applying the rule of lenity, it is
difficult to imagine that there are many circumstances in which the legislative intent is so clear that double description will be permissible.187
The fact that the court does not explain why the statutes in Montoya
are vague opens the door for defendants to challenge any number of statutes for double description violations. Montoya overruled three cases that
gave courts guidance on how to interpret the shooting at a motor vehicle
and homicide statutes without giving clear instructions on how those statutes should now be interpreted. Furthermore, the precise role of the rule
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184. See id. ¶¶ 34, 36.
185. See, e.g., State v. Sisneros, 2013-NMSC-049, ¶39, 314 P.3d 665 (citing Montoya
for the proposition that one conviction must be vacated when convictions for homicide and shooting at a motor vehicle both stem from the same act of shooting the
victim); State v. Olsson and Ballard, 2014-NMSC-___, ¶ 2, No. 33,226 (Apr. 21, 2014)
(holding that the legislature’s definition of the unit of prosecution for possession of
child pornography is ambiguous and that the rule of lenity therefore only allowed
prosecution of the defendants for one count each).
186. See State v. Dominguez, 2005-NMSC-001, ¶¶ 28–42, 137 N.M. 1, 106 P.3d 563
(Bosson, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, Chavez, J., dissenting); State
v. Riley, 2010-NMSC-005, ¶¶ 39–49, 147 N.M. 557, 226 P.3d 656 (Chavez, C.J., specially concurring, Bosson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, Daniels, J.,
specially concurring).
187. But see Swafford v. State, 1991-NMSC-043, ¶ 36, 112 N.M. 3, 810 P.2d 1223
(holding that the legislature intended to impose separate punishments for violations
of criminal sexual penetration and incest statutes).
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of lenity continues to be unclear, though it is obvious that the court intends to incorporate it into the double description analysis.
VI. CONCLUSION

35097-nmx_44-2 Sheet No. 118 Side B

Double description is a complicated area of law that troubles courts
across the nation as criminal statutory schemes become increasingly complex. As legislatures create laws that outlaw very specific activity, courts
struggle to interpret when legislatures intended for the defendant to be
punished under each statute he violated, even when the conduct was
unitary.
Montoya limits the circumstances in which the State may secure
convictions for defendants under more than one statute for unitary conduct. However, Montoya does not explain how shooting at a motor vehicle and voluntary manslaughter remain vague after a thorough
examination of legislative intent, thus opening the door for the rule of
lenity to apply to many more statutes without really explaining what is
ambiguous about them. In fact, a closer look at State v. Varela indicates
that the statutes at issue in Montoya are not vague at all, and shows how
the court could have reached the result it wanted without addressing the
rule of lenity.
Montoya has the potential to change the course of double jeopardy
jurisprudence in New Mexico. Although it may be construed narrowly
and only apply to shooting at a motor vehicle and voluntary manslaughter, it is clear from the court’s complete explanation of double description
cases that it will apply broadly. Montoya makes a bold assault on multiple
punishments, is sure to be persuasive in future cases, and will aid the
court in narrowing double description as much as possible.
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